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1. Introduction
The word 'bureaucracy' makes most people think of government --
departments of taxation, welfare, police, you name it. But actually
bureaucracies are found everywhere: corporations, churches, the
military, trade unions, political parties, schools, hospitals. Most
people accept them as a necessary part of life, although they may
complain about them. Nobody likes getting caught in bureaucratic
regulations, popularly called 'red tape'.
Yet most bureaucracies are pretty new. Several hundred years ago
there were hardly any bureaucracies like the familiar ones today.
Bureaucracies have gradually become the main way to organise
work. Their key characteristics are:
hierarchy: bosses at the top, workers at the bottom;
division of labour: different people do different specialised
tasks, such as salespeople, secretaries and accountants in a
company;
rules describing the duties of workers;
standard operating procedures.
Bureaucracies have some good points. Bureaucratic principles
allow a certain degree of fairness: everyone is supposed to be
treated the same way. There is a procedure to make sure work
gets done.
But there are also problems. Many workers in bureaucracies find
their work incredibly boring. Because work is segmented, it is
hard to know what other people are doing. There is no apparent
common social perception.
Bureaucracies can be used for antisocial purposes. Modern
warfare is deadly because bureaucracies are so efficient in
organising for military purposes, especially the weapons industry
and the army but also the mobilisation of entire economies for
war. The Nazi genocide was the work of an efficient bureaucracy.
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Most of the members of the Nazi bureaucracies just did their jobs.
Considering how important bureaucracies are and the sort of
problems they can cause, you'd think there would be plenty of
information available about how to challenge them. But there
isn't. Lots of researchers have studied how bureaucracies work,
but only a few have studied how to change them.
We got onto this topic because we have been investigating
nonviolent methods of resistance to aggression and repression.
Suppose an aggressor takes over a country, as in the case of the
Nazi occupation of Europe. To run the occupied countries, the
Nazis often preferred to use the existing administration. In other
words, the Nazis got the local bureaucracies to do their work for
them, such as collecting taxes and keeping records on the
population. This also included sending goods back to Germany,
forced labour in Germany, and the arrest of Jews and others.
Some of the bureaucrats resisted. Others cooperated. When top
bureaucrats serve the cause of oppression, subordinates and
outsiders need to know how to challenge them.
But many people would like to challenge the bureaucrats at the
top -- what we call bureaucratic elites -- for other reasons. Some
elites are corrupt. Some discriminate against particular groups.
Some divert the organisation from its proper function. Since in a
bureaucratic hierarchy there are 'elites' up and down the ladder,
challenges may need to be made anywhere along the hierarchy.
We set out to find some examples of organised and effective
grassroots challenges to bureaucratic elites. This was not so easy.
Most challenges are unsuccessful. Even the challenges that are
successful often just lead to changes in policies or personnel. The
bureaucratic structures continue on as before.
We are interested only in challenges that are nonviolent and that
are in support of goals such as justice, equality, freedom and
liberation inside and outside the bureaucracy. Furthermore, we
are interested mainly in challenges mounted from the bottom,
especially by workers or clients. This means we haven't considered
administrative takeovers or destruction of bureaucracies,
corporate buy-outs or military conquest. Nor have we considered
struggles between bureaucratic elites inside the same organisation
or in different ones.
We did find some good examples. Some are recent and local
challenges. We interviewed key individuals to find out the inside
story. Most of all, we were interested in lessons about how to wage
a successful struggle. We added a few cases documented in
articles and books. We decided to include some unsuccessful
challenges too. These provide some of the most useful lessons.
In Section 2 we tell a bit about theories of bureaucracy. Since
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we're interested in how to challenge bureaucratic elites, most of
the theories are not very helpful. There are, though, a few ideas of
value, especially the idea that a bureaucracy is similar to an
authoritarian political system. Section 3 gives the case studies. In
Section 4, we look at nonviolent challenges to authoritarian
political systems and the lessons that can be drawn for
challenging bureaucracies. Section 5 briefly describes some
alternatives to bureaucracy. Section 6 sums up the insights from
our analysis.
 
2. The nature of bureaucracy
What it is
Bureaucracy is a way of organising work based on hierarchy and
division of labour. Hierarchy means that some people are officially
in positions of power over others. In an army, generals give
commands to colonels, colonels give commands to majors, and so
on down to privates. Similarly, the chief executive of a company is
officially in a position of power over their deputies and so on
down to the bottom level of workers.
Division of labour means that different people do different parts of
the work. For example, on a traditional assembly line in a car
manufacturing plant, one worker might put the same bolts on car
after car while others work on windows, fenders, painting and so
on. Yet other workers specialise in car design, marketing,
cleaning, accounting and so forth.
Hierarchy and division of labour are the key features of
bureaucracy. Other characteristic features are standard operating
procedures and rules which describe the duties of workers. This
results in the familiar 'red tape' encountered by clients of large
service bureaucracies. Workers follow detailed regulations, often
causing frustrating delays.
A bureaucratic organisation can operate more or less the same
irrespective of the identities of individual workers. As long as
there is someone who can fill a particular slot and follow orders,
operations will continue. Thus in a bureaucracy the workers are
replaceable cogs. Each worker or cog does what is required; if one
isn't working properly, then it can be replaced by another. No one
is essential. Even the top boss can be replaced and things will go
on just about the same as before.
Bureaucracies are very common in today's society. Most
government bodies are bureaucracies, including government
departments, schools, the military and the police. Most large
corporations are run bureaucratically, as are most large churches,
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political parties and trade unions.
This idea of bureaucracy is somewhat different from the everyday
picture, which is usually of a government department such as the
tax office. Government departments are indeed good examples of
bureaucracy, but so are large corporations. The key is the way
work is organised. When an organisation such as a bank changes
from government ownership to private ownership or vice versa --
a process called privatisation or nationalisation -- often the actual
work done is not affected very much. The bureaucratic structure is
left unchanged.
Bureaucracy seems so common that people sometimes think it is
the only way to organise work. But there are some other ways.
Work is done in families -- cooking, cleaning, shopping, etc. -- but
families are not bureaucracies, at least not many of them!
Members of families are not replaceable cogs. It matters who is
the mother or father, and good work does not usually result in a
promotion up the hierarchy! The same applies to some small
businesses, where personal relationships take precedence over
official lines of authority. Some other nonbureaucratic ways of
organising work are feudal estates, a free market of individual
workers, and self-managing collectives.
 
Bureaucracy as a modern phenomenon
Bureaucracies are so common that it is tempting to think that
they are inevitable and have always been the standard way of
organising work. But actually bureaucracy has only become
standard in the past couple of hundred years.
The rise of bureaucracy has been closely linked to the rise of the
modern state. The 'state' is a term used to refer to the government
and related entities including the military, police, legal system,
and the various functions run by the government such as welfare,
schools and diplomacy. The foundation of the state is its
monopoly over large-scale violence that the state itself claims is
legitimate, namely by the military and police, within a particular
territory.
States aren't very old. There were some early states, such as the
Egyptian and Roman empires, but they were the exception. Most
people worked on the land and were largely unaffected by
bureaucratic systems. The modern state as we know it really got
going in Europe several hundred years ago. War and taxation
were primary motivations. In order to obtain revenues for
warfare, it was necessary to set up a system to collect taxes, and
in order to obtain taxes from unwilling subjects, a military
establishment was necessary. To keep track of people and their
taxes required detailed record-keeping and people to keep the
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records. The work of taxation officials was organised
bureaucratically in order to avoid the special interests that would
otherwise undermine the effort. Control had to be exercised at the
top -- by the rulers, such as a king -- so that money was not
siphoned off by intermediaries.
In many ways bureaucracy was a great advance over previous
ways of organising work. Individuals such as the rulers of feudal
estates could be unfair and cruel, rewarding their favourites and
punishing others. Bureaucracy promised to end the personal
biases and corruption that were so common in rule by individuals.
Bureaucracies were supposed to work fairly. A person who did
work well could be promoted, and it was not supposed to depend
on family ties and other factors not related to performance.
Even so, it is helpful to remember that bureaucracy developed as a
system ideally suited for the state and the military. Bureaucracies
allowed a few people at the top to control the work of vast
numbers of individuals. The military is the nearest to an 'ideal'
bureaucracy, with rigid roles, rules and hierarchy. The military
was essential to the rise of the state and vice versa, and both were
linked to the rise of bureaucracy.
Needless to say, not all bureaucracies are the same. Patterns of
control vary from organisation to organisation and can change.
For example, in recent years many corporations in the
manufacturing sector have eliminated middle management and
introduced sophisticated technology, thus producing a different
pattern of control.
 
Understanding bureaucracy
In most textbooks, bureaucracy is said to be a system of
administration, for getting jobs done. The focus then is on how
well the system is working, what problems there are, how to
improve the performance of managers, how to forge appropriate
links with other organisations, and so forth. This perspective is
usually uncritical of bureaucracy as a system of organisation. It
certainly gives no hints about how workers or clients might
challenge bureaucratic elites. Indeed, among the vast number of
studies of bureaucracy it is difficult to find more than a few hints
for workers or clients on how to confront and change a
bureaucratic system. That's one reason why we set out to find out
about how to challenge bureaucratic elites.
Deena Weinstein and a few others have developed a perspective
on bureaucracy that gives useful insights for challengers. They say
that a bureaucracy is similar to a political system. In a
bureaucracy, there are ruling groups and opposition groups,
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attempts to climb the system and attempts to seize power.
A bureaucracy is not like a liberal democratic political system.
There are no elections and workers have few civil rights. Rather, a
bureaucracy is similar to an authoritarian political system, in
which the rulers -- the bureaucratic elites -- have a large degree of
unaccountable power and the subjects -- most of the workers --
have few rights and little control over the rulers. Whistleblowers --
employees who speak out in the public interest -- are similar to
political dissidents: they are attacked and discredited. Organised
challenges to bureaucratic elites are like opposition movements in
dictatorships: the elites do everything possible to smash them.
In an authoritarian political system, the rulers can use violence
against opponents. Violence is not normally an option for
bureaucratic elites, except in the military where deserters and
traitors can be arrested and imprisoned or even shot in times of
war. Bureaucracy can be seen as a system of authoritarian rule
without physical violence. The methods used against challengers
include dismissal, demotion, withdrawal of support, harassment
and slander. These are not as fearful as killing and imprisonment.
But penalties short of physical violence are potent. Many people
value their jobs greatly, both for the pay and for self-esteem. The
stress of going against the grain and the threat of losing jobs make
most people conform.
 
Why change bureaucracy?
There are several reasons why it is worthwhile investigating and
promoting alternatives to bureaucracy.
Corruption
Many bureaucracies are corrupt. Bribes may have to be paid to
get service. Cuts are taken from payments to enrich a few at the
top. Appointments are made on the basis of patronage, not merit.
The organisation is serving special interests rather than the
public.
Corruption is a potential problem with all organisations, not just
bureaucracies. The very idea of bureaucracy, operating on the
basis of merit and defined rules, is intended to overcome the
problems of corruption. But often the bureaucracy simply
becomes a way to make corruption more efficient.
Unaccountable power
Bureaucracies are based on inequality of power. Superiors have
power over subordinates, and top bureaucrats have power over
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everyone. In a system of liberal democracy, government
bureaucracies are supposedly accountable to the will of the people
via elected officials. But control over actions of bureaucracies by a
few officials at the top is difficult. Often it is the top bureaucrats
who call the shots.
In the case of corporate bureaucracies, there is no formal control
over bureaucratic elites at all. Supposedly, the competitive
economic system provides some sort of 'market discipline', but
this is often an illusion, especially in the case of large
corporations. Government regulators seldom investigate or
prosecute abuses by corporate elites. Workers and consumers
have a difficult time organising to challenge these bureaucratic
elites.
The fundamental problem is that top bureaucrats have a great
deal of power over others. Lord Acton said that 'power tends to
corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely'. There is plenty of
evidence to back this up. Even the most idealistic and egalitarian
person, when put in a position of great power, is susceptible to
corruption -- not necessarily for personal gain, but corruption in
the sense of serving those with power and wealth.
Bureaucracy and domination
Because bureaucracies permit a small number of people to control
the work of many others, they are ideally designed to oppress
people in an efficient manner. The key bureaucracies involved in
dictatorships are the military, police and prisons. Indeed, the
military, police and prisons are closer to the bureaucratic ideal
than just about any other organisations. They are essentially
systems based on command. The key to the military is obedience
to orders. This, of course, is the opposite of democracy.
In times of war, entire societies are run on military lines. The
economy is mobilised for military production, in command
fashion. The best description of a liberal democracy in wartime is
'constitutional dictatorship'.
When the war is over, there is no need for massive armies and
central control over the economy. But, often, elites are reluctant to
relinquish their power. After World War I, British Prime Minister
Lloyd George persisted with the highly centralised war cabinet
until forced to change due to popular protest. After World War II,
allied armies had to be rapidly demobilised because otherwise the
soldiers would have revolted. In spite of the collapse of the Soviet
threat in the 1990s, western governments have been very slow in
cutting back on military expenditure.
Basically, bureaucracies are a convenient tool for domination.
That means that when an aggressor or usurper takes over a
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society, the easiest way to rule it is by using existing bureaucracies
to run things. The people in bureaucracies have been accustomed
to obey the rules and their superiors. So all the new ruler has to
do is change the directives at the top. If the top bureaucrats are
willing to go along with the new regime, that's fine. Otherwise,
they can be replaced by people who are willing to obey.
Therefore, in order to be able to resist aggression and oppression,
workers in bureaucracies need to know how to resist their bosses.
If they only know how to acquiesce, they may become
accomplices. Effective disobedience is necessary to defend human
rights and values when they are being violated. This was the
original idea behind our study of how to challenge bureaucratic
elites.
 
What sort of change?
What does it mean to change bureaucracy? Three answers are
change of policy, change of personnel and change in structure.
A change of policy means getting a bureaucracy to do things
differently than before. It might mean that a corporation stops (or
starts) dumping hazardous waste, that a government education
authority introduces a new syllabus, or that a church allows
women to become priests. Campaigns to change policies are
common and are reported every day. That doesn't mean it is easy
to succeed. Most changes of policy are introduced at the top, by
bureaucratic elites or by directors of the bureaucracy, such as
politicians in the case of state bureaucracies. For workers or
clients to change policies can be extremely difficult. Even getting a
small pay increase sometimes may require serious action such as
a strike.
Another sort of change in bureaucracy is replacement of
personnel. When corruption is prevalent, a standard demand is to
get rid of the corrupt individuals at the top.
Changing policies or personnel has some effect on a bureaucracy,
but that doesn't change the structure: the hierarchy, the division
of labour, the standard operating procedures. As long as the
bureaucracy is organised the same way, it is likely to continue
doing the same sorts of things. A few policies may change and a
few individuals may be replaced, but everything is still organised
to continue the same sorts of activities. That's why, when citizen
protests help to shut down a proposal for a freeway, the
government road authority is likely to propose another one. That's
why, when top officials are replaced due to a loud campaign, that
the new officials often continue to do the same sorts of things. To
achieve fundamental change, a change in the structure of the
organisation is necessary. However, few campaigns seek to achieve
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this. The focus is usually on the surface aspects, the policies and
the personnel.
 
3. Case studies
To illustrate how bureaucratic elites can be challenged, we
investigated a range of areas and picked out the following seven
case studies. Several of them are local examples, allowing us to
interview key participants and gain insights that might otherwise
be unreported. In every case we obtained relevant documents. We
sent drafts of our accounts to knowledgeable individuals and
relied on their comments in making revisions.
These short accounts are not meant to be definitive. In every case
there is much more that could be said -- many additional
intriguing issues, alternative perspectives, reservations and
qualifications. We didn't set out to write detailed histories, but
rather just to learn some lessons about how to challenge
bureaucratic elites.
 
Movement for the Ordination of Women
Most churches were and are run by men. For women of a church
to demand equal treatment is a profound challenge to the church
powerholders, to be resisted at all costs. This has nowhere been
more true than in the Sydney Diocese of the Anglican Church, a
very conservative and entrenched church bureaucracy. Two of the
women who led a challenge to this bureaucracy were Patricia
Brennan and Eileen Baldry.
As long as they can remember, the Anglican Church was part of
Patricia's and Eileen's lives. They grew up in Sydney through the
evangelical era of Billy Graham in the 1960s. The church was for
them a way of becoming passionately involved with Christianity.
At the same time, it seemed to be the place for asking serious
questions. Anglicans have a tradition of intellect. Meetings with
other Anglicans were a way to develop the mind, to belong, to find
a mission in life. Eileen and Patricia became involved with the
Evangelical Union and were closely associated with this group as
they worked their way through university.
Eileen and Patricia, among others in their group, went overseas on
various forms of mission work in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Patricia became a medical missionary in Africa; Eileen went to
Nepal as a teacher in a mission school. They came back with a
bittersweet understanding of Christianity, with real questions
about the patronising, racist and culturally destructive nature of
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what many Christians were doing in other parts of the world. For
these women, serious doubts were emerging about the nature of
Christianity and the nature of their faith.
Most of all, they wanted to ask questions about the relations of
power in the church bureaucracy, a matter quite separate from the
teachings of Christ. A key question was the position of women in
the church.
When institutions and organisations attempt to justify their
behaviour with reasons, but operate politically, they are working
on a model of power, not religion. The church operates on a
military model. Yet the church promises an independent source of
inspiration and power, namely God. Thus, the church has
ideological power as well. A third source of power is the idea of the
church as a family -- the very best that the social world can offer.
Yet within these systems, there is little room for challenging
attitudes. Once the women tried to raise issues about the role of
women, the male clergy set up barriers to discussion and barriers
to change.
The church inoculates members against attitude change. Patricia
and Eileen, among other women in the Sydney Diocese, found
that their questions were neither listened to nor answered. There
was real resistance, both intellectual and emotional, to their need
to raise these issues.
In about 1980, some of the clergy -- concerned that the Anglican
Church be able to respond to issues raised by the feminist
movement -- asked a group of women to discuss the questions of
women's liberation and the role of women. At those meetings, the
seed was sown to develop a reform group. The women read widely
on feminist literature, on the Vietnam war, and other issues of the
day. Patricia did a survey of women in the Sydney Diocese which
revealed that a far greater number of them than they had
previously thought were concerned about the lack of participation
by women in the church bureaucracy as well as in the spiritual
activities of the church. These were not just radical women; they
were women of all political persuasions.
In 1983, at a special meeting, the Movement for the Ordination of
Women (MOW) was formed. The first aim in MOW's constitution
was to 'move the Anglican Church of Australia to admit women to
the ordained ministries of the church'.
Both Patricia and Eileen were founding members of MOW. When
it leaked out that a reform group had started, the doors to
negotiation rapidly closed. The power of the hierarchy lay in not
listening to the women. People opposed to MOW refused to talk
to members of the group, and pretended they did not exist. Power
lay in the church committees, in the rhetoric of theology, in
money, and in the male hierarchy of church positions.
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Although not all the women were inspired by feminism, the group
developed, through readings and discussion, a language with
which the bureaucracy could be challenged. Another vital factor
was the realisation that the struggle had a purpose which was
passionate, a matter of life and death. If a woman, with her faith
and her mission, is not relevant to the church, then who is? The
restriction placed on women by the male-dominated church was
like a foot placed on someone else's oxygen supply.
MOW used five main strategies to bring about change: education,
persuasion, media, demonstrations, and working through the
church bureaucracy. Education allowed them to inform: to find
arguments from both the literature and from the Bible, and to
print and distribute papers. Persuasion became easier after the
MOW went national in 1985, and membership grew dramatically.
This support was vital. However, rational argument alone
wouldn't have got MOW very far.
MOW's most effective allies were the mass media. (The local
church media, not surprisingly, mostly supported the church
hierarchy.) Their talks, media releases, initiatives and actions
regularly received sympathetic coverage. The best sources of
favourable coverage were visits by female clergy from overseas.
Demonstrations assisted the media campaign and vice versa.
Symbolic actions were vital to MOW's campaign. For example, on
an anniversary of Martin Luther's famous challenge to the
Catholic Church, MOW put its demands on a church door. This
was wonderful symbolism and was lapped up by the media.
Patricia thinks they should have been more courageous and nailed
the demands on the door, just like Martin Luther. Instead, the
women, afraid of what people would think if they damaged church
property, stuck the demands on with removable gum.
There was a cost that came along with the intense media interest
in MOW. The media wanted a single spokesperson, and this
usually was Patricia. Yet MOW, which tried to work as a group of
equals, contained many talented women. The media's constant
focus on a few MOW 'leaders' was therefore a source of internal
tension.
The fifth strategy was working through the internal bureaucracy,
by attempting to join official bodies such as committees, synods,
etc. This did not last long -- they were stopped by the Sydney
Anglican Church League, which was vehemently opposed to the
MOW members. Patricia was in a ballot to become a member of
the National Synod, but when the position came up, she was
passed over. The Anglican Church League controlled all the
committees in the Sydney Diocese, and put out a voting ticket for
every Synod. It controlled finance and was very influential over
appointments within the church.
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The struggle to change the bureaucracy came to a head in 1992,
when the National Synod voted to admit women as ministers of
the church. Despite last minute actions from the Sydney Diocese
representatives to stop a secret ballot, the mood was against the
Sydney Diocese and the vote for women's ordination was passed
by two votes by the clergy. It is now acceptable, except in the
Sydney Diocese, to consider women as equal to men in the
church. However, the bureaucratic structure is unchanged, and
there is still a long struggle ahead.
The fear of MOW seemed out of all proportion to its message.
There seemed to be a fear of something happening to God. It was
really a fear of women and what women represent.
On reflection, the women realised the importance of picking a
single issue that is potent symbolically (in this case, getting
women ordained). None in the group thought at the beginning
that ordination was all they were aiming for. The deeper challenge
was to the patriarchal nature of the church, not only in decision
making and control in management, but also for example in
elements of the service.
The bishops were mostly sympathetic to MOW. On the other
hand, the clergy (priests) turned out to be more hostile and
powerful than expected. They were protecting their power.
It would have been easy for the women to leave the church and
start their own reformed church -- and many of their opponents
would have welcomed this. Yet, in a voluntary organisation such
as the church, to have any chance of success it is absolutely
essential for challengers to remain members of the organisation.
MOW did not set out to challenge the actual structure of the
church. It aimed to open up access to the positions of authority,
not to undermine authority itself. Of course, many male elites of
the church did not see the difference, which is why they felt that a
challenge to their positions was a challenge to the church itself,
and even to God. Questioning the structure of the church is
perhaps the next stage of a feminist challenge, which might
include feminist theology. But for such a challenge to succeed, it
may be helpful for MOW to shut up shop and make room for
other initiatives.
 
Vince Neary versus State Rail
Vince Neary worked for over twenty years as a railway signals
engineer, first with the London Transport Authority and then,
since 1974, with the State Rail Authority (SRA) in the Australian
state of New South Wales (NSW). His career was untroubled until
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1987, when he discovered what he believed to be deficiencies in
the signalling system used by the SRA. He also discovered
corruption in signalling projects for which he was responsible,
such as people senior to him engaging consultants and charging
their fees to projects for which he was responsible and for which
he had no evidence of any work done.
Neary complained first of all to the people responsible for the
unsafe signalling practices and for the misappropriation of funds
from his project. He was either ignored or ostracised.
In May 1989, Neary complained to the SRA's chief executive, Ross
Sayers, who set up a task force. According to Sayers -- many
months later -- the task force found no problems. But Sayers
refused to reveal the report of the task force.
In February 1990, Neary took his complaint to his local member
of state parliament, Nick Greiner, who was the premier of NSW at
the time. Greiner referred the issue to Bruce Baird, NSW Minister
for Transport. Baird simply replied that investigations by the task
force had revealed no problems. Greiner refused to meet with
Neary.
In May 1990, Neary complained to the NSW Ombudsman. Taking
advice from the SRA, the Ombudsman declined to investigate,
saying that the safety issue was being dealt with by the SRA -- a
conclusion which Neary disputed.
In August 1990, Neary complained to the Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). In February 1992, ICAC
announced plans for a public inquiry into the SRA's treatment of
Neary. A few months later ICAC told Neary the inquiry would not
be held since it would take too much hearing time.
Also in August 1990, Neary took the issue to the NSW Auditor-
General's office, which oversees the finances of government
departments. By this time Neary had extensive documentation not
only of unsafe signalling practices and suspected corruption but
also of SRA attempts to cover up the problems. The person at the
Auditor-General's office dealing with Neary's complaint was Dick
Dunn. According to Neary, Dunn told him the SRA had failed to
supply documents -- in some cases claiming that they were lost --
showing that consultants had done work for the fees paid. Dunn
also told Neary that if the SRA did not produce the documents
after a formal request, the Auditor-General would probably refer
to this in his report to parliament. The next time Neary contacted
the Auditor-General's office, he found out that Dunn had been
seconded for two years to work for the SRA! According to Dunn,
this secondment was at the request of the SRA and the
encouragement of the Auditor-General. In November 1992, Neary
received a letter from the Auditor-General indicating that the
investigations by Dunn and his staff into consultancies revealed
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nothing wrong.
In September 1990, Neary used Freedom of Information
procedures to obtain a copy of the SRA task force report. The SRA
opposed this with every means possible. Neary finally obtained it
four years later.
In January 1991, Neary made new complaints about unsafe
signalling practices. In response, the SRA commissioned a retired
British signalling engineer, Brian Hesketh, to investigate.
Hesketh's report, published in May 1991, basically vindicated
Neary's concerns.
The more that Neary pressed for consideration of his complaints,
the more harassment he encountered in his job. Shortly after
release of Hesketh's report, Neary was demoted and directed to
undertake clerical duties. He was sent to several psychiatrists for
examination, a process that also served as a form of harassment.
In May 1992 he was attacked in parliament by Bruce Baird, the
Transport Minister. In June, Neary was directed to stay at home
on full pay indefinitely. When in November 1992 he declined to
accept being relegated to a clerical position, his pay was stopped.
He was dismissed from his job in March 1993 for going public
with his complaints. He made an appeal against his dismissal to
the Transport Appeals Board but was unsuccessful.
The lesson from this saga is that a single principled dissident
stands little chance against a powerful bureaucracy. It is only a
slight generalisation to say that the official channels can be relied
upon not to work. Dissidents often hope that there is some
authority, somewhere, that will look at the facts and act to serve
the public interest. This belief in justice must be rejected.
Bureaucracies such as the SRA operate on the basis of power, not
justice.
Neary started to have some success only when he was able to tap
into alternative sources of power, outside institutional channels.
He made contact with the organisation Whistleblowers Australia
and became a board member. He wrote an informative 26-page
report documenting his allegations and his experiences. He made
contact with a few sympathetic politicians. In October 1993, the
Ombudsman recommended that an independent technical
assessment be made into SRA signalling practices. The media gave
prominent coverage to this development and to Neary's treatment.
In August 1995, Neary reached a settlement with the SRA,
obtaining some compensation. Part of the settlement was that he
not reveal the terms of the settlement itself. Furthermore, no
action was taken against SRA officials responsible for the
problems Neary reported or against those who victimised him for
his whistleblowing. On the other hand, on the day after Neary's
settlement, it was announced that there would be a public inquiry
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into the SRA by the NSW Auditor-General, dealing with
corruption, harassment, fraud, mismanagement and safety.
[After reading this publication, Chris Wheeler, Deputy
Ombudsman, wrote to us in May 1997 pointing out that although
it was technically correct that the NSW Ombudsman had declined
to investigate (in 1990), this did not "accurately reflect the work
done by this Office in response to various complaints made to Mr
Neary." The Ombudsman's Office in October 1993 made a 40-
page special report to Parliament about Neary's allegations. It
recommended setting up a full public inquiry since it did not have
the resources to carry out a full investigation. Its preliminary (but
nevertheless fairly detailed) investigation showed that Neary's
complaints warranted an independent technical assessment. The
report also noted the SRA's reprisals against Neary and pointed to
a flaw in the proposed whistleblowers protection bill, namely that
"the Bill does not enable the Ombudsman to investigate a public
authority's victimisation of a whistleblower."]
 
The Vatican versus the Modernists
At the very end of the 1800s, the Roman Catholic Church was
confronted within its ranks by a 'modernist movement'. It was led
by a small number of scholars, especially Alfred Loisy, a French
priest who published a key book in 1903. The central organiser
was Friedrich von Hügel, an English lay scholar, who brought
members together through a vigorous correspondence, visits and
conferences. Journals were also important in mobilising the
movement.
Some critics questioned the Bible's story of creation, others the
Pope's authority. Loisy said that the church hierarchy existed for
the sake of the church membership, not vice versa. But what
united the modernists was not particular claims but a general
approach to doctrine and dogma. The modernists proposed that
critical methods of inquiry could be used to search for truth
within the Catholic framework. Thus they questioned the idea of
dogma as conventionally asserted by the Vatican. As the
movement developed, wider agendas of reform of the church
hierarchy became more important.
The church hierarchy attacked the modernists in a variety of ways.
It put modernist writings on the long-established Index of
Prohibited Books, issued official condemnations, set up a
committee in each diocese to watch out for suspicious activities
and people, insisted that clergy take an antimodernist oath, set up
a secret international coordinating body (the Sapinière) to report
on suspected heresy to the Vatican, hindered the careers of
possible opponents, and excommunicated leading dissidents.
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These measures were effective, and the movement was dead by
1909.
But this isn't all there is to the story. The Vatican actually needed
the movement to exist.
In the 1800s, the power and authority of the church were in
decline. The power of governments was increasing, especially in
France since the French Revolution, at the expense of the church.
Modern science was growing in persuasiveness, and sometimes it
was used to challenge theological dogma, notably in the case of
Darwin's theory of evolution. Social movements and doctrines,
from liberalism to socialism and feminism, asserted the power of
individual choice and collective action against the dictates of
established authority. As well, for at least a century there had been
vigorous movements against the authority of the church, which
symbolised undemocratic regimes. These developments were a
part of a 'modernist' challenge to the church hierarchy.
But the Vatican could do little about social change outside the
church. So it responded by mobilising its internal authority, for
example by establishing the principle that the Pope is infallible
and mounting campaigns against heresy. These attacks against
internal dissent, by creating an enemy, served to mobilise support
and to maintain the authority of the church hierarchy.
This focus on dissenters actually fostered the formation of the
modernist movement within the church. For example,
denunciations of individuals and the listings on the Index of
Prohibited Books drew the attention of modernist leaders to like-
minded thinkers. Ironically, the modernist movement then
provided a method for the church hierarchy to strengthen itself:
the campaign against heresy highlighted common values and built
up bonds through action against the inside enemy.
The Vatican responded to the decline of the church's external
power and authority by asserting its control internally. The
modernists were challengers to the Catholic church's bureaucratic
elite, but they ended up being a means for cementing the power of
the elite. The lesson for challengers is to be aware that attacks on
challengers may be part of a larger process of mobilisation of
internal control. But even if they are aware of it, what can they do
about it? This is not an easy question to answer!
Les Kurtz, author of a study of this conflict, thinks that there are
two lessons for challengers. 'First, efforts to increase internal
control may well backfire, especially in earlier stages of the
movement. Earlier repression of the movement helps to provoke
additional opposition and a sympathetic response from
supporters. Second, most conflicts move quickly to questions of
authority that obscure the original issues raised by dissidents. The
real modernist crisis concerned the authority of the Vatican
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hierarchy. Although it may be impossible to avoid the negative
aspects of such conflicts, one way to minimise adverse fallout is to
focus on Gandhi's advice to separate the doer from the deed so
that elites are clearly informed that they are not being attacked
personally.'
 
Prison reform in New South Wales
The colony of New South Wales was founded in 1788 as a penal
settlement for British convicts. The early decades of white
invasion and colonisation of Australia were marked by harsh
brutality against both Aborigines and white convicts.
Some of this brutality persisted two centuries later in the state's
prison system. It was much more a system of punishment than
rehabilitation. Conditions were appalling: disgusting food, freezing
or roasting temperatures, removal of personal belongings, no
work, long periods confined to cells. Then there was the violence.
Many prisoners were beaten by prison officers for little or no
reason. At Grafton Gaol, in northern NSW, where 'intractable'
prisoners were sent, up to the late 1970s new arrivals were
systematically and brutally bashed by warders, often for days.
As a result of these conditions, in the 1970s there were protests
and riots by prisoners. In one such revolt, Bathurst Gaol was burnt
down in 1974.
These 'disturbances' led the NSW government to set up a royal
commission -- with strong powers of investigation -- to study the
problem and recommend changes. The royal commission
recognised the brutality and inhumanity of the NSW prison
system and made numerous recommendations aimed at bringing
conditions in line with standard enlightened practice in Europe
and North America.
Instead of ignoring the report, which is the fate of most such
reports, the government acted on it. It accepted almost all the
recommendations. To implement the report, it appointed a five-
member Corrective Services Commission, headed by Tony Vinson,
a reform-minded outsider.
The reform agenda of the Commission was supported warmly by
almost all of the prisoners. But it was also opposed, particularly by
the Prison Officers' Union. The prison officers of the 'old guard'
were adamantly opposed to any change that would reduce their
privileges or their power over prisoners. They opposed any
penalties for unlawful beatings by prison officers in the past, and
many wished to continue with their brutal methods.
Vinson found that it was impossible to make significant changes
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by simply issuing directives, since they were often simply not
followed. Simple requests to build recreation facilities were
delayed for months. So he had to follow up with personal
inspections himself.
Old guard prison officers aimed to get rid of Vinson and maintain
the status quo. On several occasions they went on strike, causing a
crisis in staffing of the prisons. In these strikes, the prisoners were
helpless victims, being placed under intolerable conditions which
they often tolerated because they supported the reform efforts.
Vinson also won the support of most prison supervisory staff, who
put in valiant efforts to maintain prison operations, as did the
police, who were called in on some occasions.
However, old guard prison officers also had another source of
support: the mass media. Most newspapers, radio and television
channels presented the strikes and other disturbances as a crisis
in 'law and order' and as evidence that the tough policies of earlier
years were needed. They portrayed every escape from prison as a
critical danger to the public and every improvement in conditions
as pandering to dangerous criminals who should be punished.
Only a minority of editors and journalists understood and
communicated the sensible findings of the royal commission that
humane treatment of prisoners -- and the reduced use of prisons
generally -- actually reduced dangers to the public.
There were also prison officers who supported the reform agenda.
But they were often given a difficult time by the entrenched
members of the old guard.
If the NSW government had remained solidly behind the
Corrective Services Commission, the reform process might have
proceeded. But the disruptive actions by the prison officers and
the enormous media attention to the disturbances put pressure on
the government in the period before an election. About two years
after Vinson's appointment, the government minister in charge of
prisons withdrew support from him. This made Vinson's task
virtually impossible, and eventually he resigned. The prison
officers had won their battle to maintain a repressive prison
system.
The establishment of the Corrective Services Commission was a
courageous but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to reform the
prison bureaucracy from the top. The Commission implemented
many specific improvements, eliminating many of the worst
excesses of the previous era. From the point of view of prison
activists -- including many prisoners -- the Commission went in
the correct general direction but made a number of mistakes. But
even full support from one group, namely the prisoners, would not
have been enough to bring about lasting structural change in the
prison bureaucracy without support from the general public.
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The Dutch soldiers' movement
The Netherlands is an affluent country with a population of 15
million and a tradition of toleration for dissent. In the 1960s, a
number of social movements arose throughout the industrialised
world, including the Netherlands. In this atmosphere, one soldier
from the large conscript force in the Dutch military said, 'Why not
have a trade union of soldiers?' The idea was raised at a meeting,
and gained support not only from other conscripts but also from
officers, who welcomed unionisation of conscripts as an adjunct to
the officers' union push for better pay and conditions. Even the
head of the armed forces was supportive. The union, with the
acronym VVDM, was founded in 1966 and quickly gained a
substantial membership.
In the early years VVDM was a 'tame' union. Many of its demands
were met quickly. For example, soldiers received an increase in
pay and were allowed to wear civilian clothes while off duty. Soon,
though, rank-and-file activism increased outside VVDM, and the
union's leaders were caught between new activists and
commanders who wanted radical demands to be damped down.
Locals chapters of the union were set up, and VVDM became
more democratic.
In 1967, a smaller and more radical organisation, BVD, was set up
by conscientious objectors. Its members also included serving
soldiers, recent veterans and activist women. In 1968-1969 the
BVD decided to become more active among conscripts and to
push VVDM towards more radical action. For many years
afterwards it continued to prod VVDM towards stronger stands.
In 1970 a VVDM activist, Henk Van der Horst, announced that he
would no longer salute anyone. He was sentenced to 8 months'
imprisonment, a harsh sentence by Dutch standards. This caused
an outcry. VVDM took up the cause. They used a variety of tactics,
such as holding a 'national saluting day', in which soldiers saluted
everyone regardless of rank, including civilians, in order to make
fun of the regulations. Eventually, in 1973 a new government
applied pressure on the Ministry of Defence, which changed the
regulations so that saluting became optional.
Another radical demand -- for soldiers -- was to wear their hair as
they desired. A campaign developed to challenge compulsory
haircuts. In 1971 Rinus Wehrmann, a new conscript, refused to
have a haircut and was given two years in prison by a military
court. This sentence triggered massive protest, with petitions and
rallies. Civilians also added their voices. The government quickly
backed down. Wehrmann was released from prison and haircut
regulations were modified.
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The struggles over salutes and hair were about symbols of
discipline and command. After the soldiers' hair victory, military
commanders and the Ministry of Defence began to attack the
developing soldiers' movement by censoring its publications. This
led to a series of struggles, including some large demonstrations
of conscripts. Eventually the government worked out a
compromise, limiting the censorship powers of local commanders.
It was another victory for the soldiers' movement.
As well as dealing with issues of freedom of expression, VVDM
campaigned vigorously for better pay and conditions. The climax
of the initial campaign was on 14 February 1974, when 8000
soldiers -- nearly one fifth of all conscripts -- from around the
country joined a demonstration at Utrecht. This campaign led to
improvements which gave Dutch conscripts salaries almost as
high as the minimum civilian wage, making them among the
highest in the world.
VVDM forged links in several directions. It worked with Dutch
civilian trade unions and also with soldiers' unions in other
countries. The Netherlands is not the only country to have a union
of soldiers. In fact, since 1965 there have been soldiers'
movements in every country where the standard of living is high
and where there is a substantial number of conscripts as a
proportion of the civilian population -- countries including
Switzerland, Sweden, US, Germany, Denmark, Norway and
France. Yet even by comparison with these other countries, the
Dutch soldiers' movement was exceptionally successful.
All was not easy, though. Military commanders started using the
tactic of preventing VVDM organisers from gaining access to new
conscripts, by making requirements for long periods of duty.
Another challenge was the setting up of an association for
conscripts, the AVNM, which was more conservative than VVDM.
However, AVNM, after gaining support, gradually became more
activist in order to maintain its membership.
After the mid 1970s, it became more difficult for VVDM to make
further gains. The society-wide activist impulse from the 1960s
was waning. Also, VVDM had been so successful that there was
less remaining to be gained. In 1979, the government lowered the
conscription age from 20 to 18; older conscripts -- such as those
who had finished university studies before undertaking their
military obligation -- were commonly the most active in the union,
so the lowered entry age reduced activism. In addition, the length
of service was reduced from 16 to 14 months and conscientious
objection was made easier, both of which weakened the potential
for soldier activism. VVDM's membership declined.
Nevertheless, the movement continued its activism in the 1980s
and 1990s. It joined the huge protests against nuclear weapons in
Europe and supported conscripts who refused guard duty at sites
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thought to contain nuclear weapons. VVDM opposed military
bans on posters in soldiers' rooms. It took action against the
violence within the military, especially violence ('hazing') against
new conscripts by officers and older conscripts. It has pushed for
an end to wasted time, when conscripts have nothing to do; in
1993 the Minister of Defence introduced 'efficiency leave', allowing
commanders to send conscripts home when there is no work for
them to do.
In 1992, VVDM decided to oppose conscription altogether. It now
believes that support for democratic principles among Dutch
professional soldiers is sufficiently strong so that conscripts are
not needed to safeguard democracy in the military.
[In 1993, the Dutch government decided to phase out
conscription. The last conscripts left the army in August 1996.]
The Dutch soldiers' movement has had an enormous impact. Its
gains have included dramatic increases in salary, much greater
freedom of expression and a considerable relaxation in arbitrary
military discipline -- discipline that is not necessary for military
efficiency. Dutch soldiers are acknowledged to be very effective
when it comes to military performance, such as getting tanks into
the field. But greater democracy in the military helps only some
sorts of military effectiveness, such as in resisting foreign
aggression. A democratic military is not so effective in repressing
the local population or fighting an aggressive war. A democratic
military will do a good job when the soldiers believe in the cause,
but not otherwise. This is the best argument of all for supporting
soldiers' movements.
 
The Australia Card
In the early 1980s, there was considerable publicity and concern
in Australia about people and companies who evaded tax. In 1985
at a national meeting to discuss tax, a few individuals suggested
the use of identity cards to reduce tax avoidance. Senior
bureaucrats in several government departments saw this as an
opportunity to achieve an objective they had had in mind for
some time.
The idea was that every Australian would have a unique
identification number. It would be used for taxation, national
health insurance, welfare payments and potentially many other
purposes. The Health Insurance Commission was to administer
the system because it had the most developed computing
expertise. Data on everyone in the country would be held in a
central databank. As well, it was proposed that every Australian
would have an identification card, which the government called
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the 'Australia Card'.
After being quickly developed by a committee with members from
several government departments, the scheme was backed by the
government. At first it was included among several other taxation
measures and did not receive much attention. Because it was
portrayed as a means to stop cheating on tax and welfare
payments, most people supported it initially.
A few individuals made significant criticisms. For example,
prominent judge Michael Kirby warned about the implications for
civil liberties. Information systems academic Roger Clarke wrote
several critical assessments, pointing out the possibility for
invasion of privacy due to the collation of data about individuals
from different aspects of their lives. He pointed out that an
identity number system would have little impact on tax revenues
or cheating on welfare payments. Sophisticated criminals could
easily beat the system. What the identity card system would do
best of all was increase the power of government bureaucrats over
the lives of ordinary Australians.
The Australian Labor Party held government federally. Although
Labor had a majority of seats in the House of Representatives, in
the Senate it did not. The government was determined to press
ahead with the Australia Card, but the opposition parties in the
Senate used their power to set up a parliamentary committee to
investigate the proposal. The majority of the committee opposed
the Card, but the government pressed ahead anyway on the basis
of a minority report. The Australia Card bill was twice passed in
the House and twice rejected in the Senate, at which time one
Labor Senator voted against the legislation and resigned from the
Labor Party. The Labor government used the repeated rejection in
the Senate as the basis for calling a general election in 1987, which
it won. This meant it could call a joint meeting of the House and
Senate and pass the legislation.
While the government pressed ahead resolutely, popular opinion
moved against the Australia Card. Civil liberties groups took
strong stands against it, and civil liberties arguments became
more and more prominent. Members of the public began writing
letters. Newspapers were inundated with letters. It was by far the
biggest issue in the country, with 80 to 90 percent of
correspondents opposed to the card. There were numerous
petitions to parliament against the scheme, with a greater total
number of signatories on this issue than any other in Australia's
history. The media, which at first had generally favoured the card,
gradually became more opposed.
In September 1987, as the government moved towards passing the
Australia Card Bill, popular opposition escalated. The Australian
Privacy Foundation was set up. Among its founding members
were prominent personalities such as pop star Peter Garrett and
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cricketer Greg Chappell. There were rallies in several parts of the
country, bringing together unlikely allies, including civil
libertarians, left-wing trade unionists and conservative bankers
and industrialists. There were demonstrations in several cities. In
Western Australia, an anti-card rally attracted tens of thousands,
the largest number since the protests against the Vietnam war.
Many individuals, in their letters to newspapers, announced their
intention to refuse to cooperate with the scheme.
All this pressure began to cause cracks in the government's ranks.
Many Labor parliamentarians privately pressured the Prime
Minister to withdraw the legislation.
Ewart Smith was a retired public servant (government bureaucrat)
with long experience in the law and legislation. The mounting
concerns stimulated him to investigate and then to join the chorus
of opposition by writing letters. He also closely inspected the
proposed legislation and found a technical feature that no one else
had noticed. Even if the legislation was passed, the Act's
commencement date had to be passed separately, and the
government would have been unable to get it through the Senate.
Smith pointed this out to members of the parliamentary
opposition, who raised the matter in parliament to the disbelief of
the government. Smith's assessment was supported by other legal
experts. The government took the opportunity to withdraw the
legislation. It was never reintroduced.
Around the country, many people had tremendous satisfaction
and relief at the defeat of the Australia Card proposal. Ewart
Smith was hailed as a hero. On the other hand, it was perhaps
unfortunate that the proposal was defeated in this way. If the
Australia Card had become law, almost certainly there would have
been civil disobedience and an escalating struggle, which would
have mobilised the population even more effectively in defence of
privacy protection and civil liberties.
What it couldn't achieve directly, the government achieved
indirectly. In 1988, the government expanded the uses of the
existing tax file number system. Every taxpayer is assigned a
unique number. People are not obliged to state the number to
employers, but if they don't, tax is withheld at the highest rate -- a
strong incentive to provide the number. When introducing the
enhanced tax file number scheme, the government promised that
it would be used only for taxation purposes. Yet within two years
it was being used for nearly every payment of pensions or benefits
by any Australian government agency, with the sort of meshing of
computer databases that critics of the Australia Card had warned
about. In other words, the tax file number is really an identity
number. The measures that have been implemented go a long way
towards achieving what the senior bureaucrats set out to do,
except that there is no actual card.
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The Australia Card was a potent symbol. At first it was a symbol
of the government's attack on tax avoidance. But, due to the
efforts of many individuals and groups, it became the symbol of
government snooping into the lives of Australians. The campaign
against the Australia Card was an amazing success, especially in
bringing together people from different parts of the political
spectrum. The campaign also attracted a range of experts,
including Ewart Smith.
Although the campaign was diverse, it never penetrated the
government bureaucracies. Therefore, the same bureaucratic
pressures for comparing computer databases remained.
Furthermore, the campaign did not create a strong continuing
organisational base. It was, perhaps, too successful too soon.
When the symbol of what it opposed was removed, the campaign
dissolved. The enhanced tax file number scheme was introduced
without much controversy.
 
Women versus a steel company
BHP is Australia's largest company. It began its operations in iron
and steel but has since diversified, especially into other minerals.
But steel remains a key part of the BHP enterprise, which controls
almost all production in Australia.
BHP's largest steelworks is located south of Sydney at Port
Kembla, a part of Wollongong, a city with approximately a quarter
of a million people. In the 1970s, over 20,000 workers were
employed at the steelworks, and there was a job for nearly any
man who applied. But for women the situation was different. Very
few were hired, while most were put on a waiting list. In 1980, the
men's waiting list had only a few dozen names, while the women's
had 2000. The reason was that BHP refused to hire women except
for traditionally female jobs such as cleaning and typing.
In the early 1970s, some women protested against BHP's hiring
practices, taking action such as chaining themselves to the gates at
the steelworks. But this initiative fizzled out without any
immediate change.
The trigger for a new campaign came from the Socialist Workers
Party (SWP), then a small left-wing party with a Trotskyist
orientation. (Today it is known as the Democratic Socialist Party.)
During a period in the late 1970s known as the 'turn to industry',
SWP members were encouraged to get jobs in industry. In
Wollongong the obvious place was the steelworks. Male members
of the SWP had no trouble getting jobs at BHP, but the female
members -- about half a dozen of them -- were rejected.
As a result, the SWP decided to launch a political campaign, 'jobs
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for women'. Publicity for the campaign led to participation of
other women who had been denied jobs at the Port Kembla
steelworks, until they numbered 34 altogether. The campaign
organisers approached the key union covering the jobs they
sought, the Federated Ironworkers Association, and gained its
support. They also obtained support from the women's movement
and left-wing activists.
Although SWP activists were the key driving force throughout
most of the campaign, they played down their SWP affiliations,
instead emphasising that it was a women's campaign. Indeed,
only a few of the 34 women were SWP members. It should be
mentioned that Wollongong, a working-class town, has a long
tradition of left-wing working-class activism. Both the SWP and
the Communist Party of Australia have had a greater public
presence and respectability in Wollongong than in most other
parts of Australia.
Most of the 34 women were migrants to Australia from non-
English-speaking countries. Their campaign was thus one of a
small disadvantaged group against a powerful transnational
corporation. But the women had one great advantage. BHP's
reputation was important to it, and it had blatantly discriminated
against women for years. The women's publicity campaign -- aided
by the SWP's national network -- was a severe embarrassment to
BHP management.
The women produced an information pamphlet, had it translated
into several relevant languages, and circulated it to BHP
employees. For two days and nights in July 1980 the women set
up a 'tent embassy' outside the gates of the steelworks. They
circulated a petition and gained the signatures of more than 2000
male steelworkers. They set up a picket at the steelworks and
organised a march. Through these actions they gained enormous
support. For BHP it was incredibly bad publicity.
The women's campaign helped spur along the official procedures,
in which the state counsellor for equal opportunity met with
representatives of BHP and the union to conciliate. In November
1980 BHP agreed to hire all 34 women. Once they were hired, the
campaign slowed down, even though there were many other
women who had been and were still denied jobs. Nevertheless, by
mid 1981 there was a second group of women organising to get
jobs following the success of the 34.
In the early 1980s, an economic recession hit Australia. By the
middle of 1981, BHP stopped hiring new workers. Soon it began
planning retrenchments. In the middle of 1982, the women
reactivated their campaign because they were afraid that the
seniority principle would see them lose their jobs first. They
argued that their seniority should date from when they first tried
to get jobs at BHP, or at least from 1977, when equal employment
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opportunity legislation took effect. Most of the 34 women lost
their jobs in late 1982 or 1983, along with thousands of men.
The women's campaign was started up again, with publicity and
building of support from trade unions, women's groups and
others. This time, though, much of the effort was channelled into
legal action. One reason for this is that the women were seeking a
lot more than jobs alone, including monetary compensation. The
court challenge aimed at overturning entrenched discriminatory
practice. But the case moved at glacial speed.
The women raised a lot of money but it was not enough to pay for
legal costs. They applied for 'legal aid' (government-funded legal
support), but it was denied by the state government. So they
mounted a campaign to obtain legal aid, which finally succeeded
two years later.
Now represented by lawyers before the Equal Opportunity
Tribunal, the women presented their case and, in September 1985,
won! They were awarded damages of over one million dollars (an
average of about $30,000 each). BHP appealed, first to the state
appeal court and then to the High Court, the highest court in the
country. BHP lost the appeals but the process took nearly four
years.
After the success of the 34 women in 1989, another court action
was begun, this time with 238 women who alleged discrimination
by BHP. It was a class action, arguing that they were in the same
'class' as the original 34 women. The case was run by the Public
Interest Advocacy Centre. An out-of-court settlement was reached
in 1994. Eventually some 700 women received payments from
BHP, though in many cases the amount was much less than the
losses they had incurred due to discrimination.
The campaign definitely changed BHP's hiring practices. The
company has allowed women into 'traditionally male' jobs. BHP
now presents itself as an equal opportunity employer. But there
haven't been many new jobs. The operation is now much more
capital-intensive. With new technology, steel production is higher
than ever but total employment at the Port Kembla steelworks is
now less than 7000, a third of what it had been before.
The campaign was remarkable in that a group with a double
disadvantage -- women, most of whom were from non-English
speaking countries -- succeeded against a rich and powerful
company. One key element in the campaign was gaining support
from key groups, including the trade unions and male
steelworkers. Many male BHP workers supported the campaign,
especially those who had wives who wanted work. The other key
element was publicity. The political climate in the country as a
whole was favourable, with equal opportunity legislation on the
books. The campaign had the advantage of being a group
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operation. The women supported each other, and between them
they had many relevant skills.
The involvement of the SWP was crucial, although this was never
widely known. Nevertheless, the SWP wasn't a perfect vehicle for
the campaign since the level of involvement by individual
members varied.
Undoubtedly BHP is still a male-dominated company. But the
entrenched and virulent resistance to women in 'male jobs' has
been greatly weakened. Most of all, the women's campaign showed
that it is possible to win against a corporate giant.
 
4. Nonviolent action against
authoritarian states
We described earlier the idea that bureaucracies are similar to
authoritarian states. This suggests that lessons about how to
challenge bureaucratic elites might be learned by studying
nonviolent challenges to authoritarian states. If nonviolent
methods work against dictatorships, then the same methods might
be used in bureaucracies.
Why nonviolent action, rather than violence, against bureaucratic
elites? There are several reasons. Most bureaucracies maintain
control without regular resort to violence. (The military and police
are partial exceptions.) The struggles within bureaucracies are, in
practice, struggles without physical violence. Therefore, an
understanding of nonviolent action is likely to be helpful.
Violence tends to alienate potential supporters. It encourages
secrecy and dependence on commanders and thus clashes with the
aim of participation and democracy. Terrorism or guerrilla
warfare against top figures in churches, corporations and
government departments is likely to create a wave of sympathy for
those who are attacked and thus be totally counterproductive.
Gene Sharp, the leading researcher on nonviolent action,
identified 198 different types of nonviolent action and provided
examples of each one. Sharp divides the methods of nonviolent
action into three categories: symbolic actions, noncooperation,
and intervention and alternative institutions.
Symbolic actions include:
formal statements (speeches, letters, petitions); 
slogans, leaflets, banners; 
rallies, protest marches, vigils, pickets; 
wearing of symbols of opposition (such as the paper clips
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worn by Norwegian civilians during the Nazi occupation); 
meetings, teach-ins. 
Noncooperation includes:
social boycott, stay-at-home;
boycotts by consumers, workers, traders; embargoes;
strikes, bans, working-to-rule, reporting 'sick';
refusal to pay tax or debts, withdrawal of bank deposits; 
boycotts of government institutions; 
disobedience, evasions and delays; 
mock incapability ('misunderstandings', 'mistakes'). 
Intervention and alternative institutions include:
fasts;
sit-ins, nonviolent obstruction and occupation;
destruction of information and records;
establishment of parallel institutions for government, media,
transport, welfare, health and education.
Nonviolent action has been used to promote social justice, as in
some of the campaigns led by Gandhi in India and the US civil
rights movement. There are also several examples of spontaneous
use of nonviolent action against military aggression, military
coups, and repressive governments:
Collapse of a military coup in Germany in 1920;
German resistance to the French and Belgian occupation of
the Ruhr in 1923;
Toppling of ten dictatorships in Central/South America,
1931-1961;
Nonviolent resistance to Nazi occupation of Europe, 1939-
1943;
Collapse of a military coup in the French army in Algeria in
1961;
Czechoslovak resistance to the Soviet invasion in 1968;
Toppling of the repressive Iranian government in 1978-79;
Toppling of the Marcos regime in the Philippines in 1986;
Palestinian intifada, a resistance to Israeli rule from 1987-
93;
Collapse of Eastern European communist regimes in 1989.
Nonviolent action against a repressive government is based on the
principle that no regime -- whether a democracy or military
dictatorship -- can survive without the passive support or
nonresistance of a large proportion of the population. In other
words, all societies are built on consent, cooperation and
obedience. Nonviolent action can systematically disrupt this
consent, cooperation and obedience and replace it by
noncooperation and disobedience.
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This has obvious applications to bureaucracies. If, in a business
corporation or a government body, large numbers of workers
refuse to carry out instructions, set up their own communications
systems and mobilise supporters from the outside, then top
officials can do little about it.
This idea applies to military forces themselves. If only a few
soldiers refuse orders, they can be arrested or shot: discipline can
be maintained. But if large numbers refuse to cooperate, an army
cannot function.
What about ruthless invaders who just keep killing people at the
least hint of resistance? What can be done to stop a programme of
total extermination? How can nonviolent action possibly work
against repressive regimes?
Real-life dictatorships are not as all-powerful as might be
imagined. Under the brutal military regimes in Argentina and
Chile, many individuals continued to openly express opposition in
the workplace, in public protests and in the media. Protests have
shaken the harsh regimes in South Korea and Burma. If
nonviolent resistance could be prepared for and expanded, then
dictatorships would be difficult to sustain.
Repression is less likely if the ruler is dependent in some way on
the nonviolent resisters. This might be economic dependence; it
could be the influence of family members who know people in the
resistance; or it could be a sense of ethnic or cultural identity. If
there is a dependency relationship, then the ruler will encounter
great obstacles if severe repression is used. But if there isn't some
direct or indirect connection between the two sides, then even a
fairly benevolent ruler may do really nasty things. Dependency,
not attitude, is the key.
The methods and tactics of nonviolent resistance need to be
specially chosen if repression is harsh. More use can be made of
quiet 'mistakes' in carrying out tasks and 'misunderstandings' of
orders. Preparation in advance is crucial for things such as
shutting down factories, protecting dissidents, providing food and
shelter for survival, maintaining communications and exposing
repression to the world. When support for the resistance becomes
widespread, open defiance becomes possible.
There is much more that could be said about the dynamics of
nonviolent action and many examples that could be given about
how it operates. We give here two examples of nonviolent action
against authoritarian regimes: the nonviolent challenges to the
dictatorship in El Salvador in 1944 and in East Germany in 1989.
Since these dictatorships have similarities to bureaucracies, these
cases provide some insight into what is required for a successful
challenge to bureaucratic elites.
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El Salvador, 1944
Maximiliano Hernández Martínez became the dictator of El
Salvador in 1931. Although he introduced some valuable reforms,
he ruthlessly crushed political opposition. In 1932, an armed
uprising was brutally put down by the military.
Opposition developed in 1943, with leaflets and petitions. The
government responded with increased censorship, arrests and
other controls. The opposition was stimulated by US government
rhetoric of a fight for freedom and democracy against Nazism.
Also important was outrage over constitutional changes allowing
Martínez to serve a further six-year term as president.
On 2 April 1944, there was a military revolt, which was repressed
harshly. This helped to trigger a nonviolent insurrection.
University students took the lead and organised a student strike,
which spread to high schools. Over a period of a few weeks,
physicians and business people joined the strike, until virtually
the entire country was at a standstill, including government
offices, banks and railways. This was essentially a stay-at-home
strike, which cut most services.
Police shot at some boys, killing one. As a result, large crowds
surged onto the streets. On 8 May, Martínez agreed to resign, and
he left the country three days later.
The military was not used to crush the insurrection. The
unreliability of the soldiers had been shown by the 2 April revolt.
The officer corps, which was loyal to Martínez, did not risk using
the army against the population.
While the nonviolent action of the people was enough to bring
down Martínez, it was not effective in ensuring a transition to a
nonrepressive society. There was a military coup later in 1944.
The years since have seen continued oppression of El Salvadoran
people.
In Guatemala a few weeks later in 1944, stimulated by the
example of El Salvador, the government was also toppled by
nonviolent insurrection. In addition to these two cases, between
1931 and 1961 eight other Central/South American presidents
were ousted by nonviolent insurrection.
The case of El Salvador illustrates that even in a police state there
are opportunities for effective nonviolent resistance, although of
course at a risk. A seemingly innocuous leaflet can be a very
significant form of defiance. Wider noncooperation can be
triggered by the process of open resistance, via strikes and further
leaflets. If nothing is done by the government, others are
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emboldened to join in; repressive steps, on the other hand, can
cause outrage and an expansion of resistance.
The nonviolence of the insurrection was important to its success.
By contrast, the 1932 armed revolt was a fiasco. The campesinos
(small farmers) killed about 100 soldiers, leading the military to
retaliate with mass executions of perhaps 10,000 people.
This case illustrates the importance of making a link between
nonviolent resistance to repression and a 'positive programme' to
create alternative institutions. Being against repression is not
enough -- action for a different system is also necessary.
These lessons apply directly to the problem of challenging a
bureaucratic elite. It is important that the climate for a challenge
be appropriate. Then it is necessary for some individuals or
groups to take the lead, such as the students in El Salvador. The
methods used must be things that everyone can do, such as going
on strike, working to rule or systematic noncooperation with
particular orders. Finally, even a victory against the existing elites
is likely to be short-lived -- new problems are likely to appear with
new bosses -- unless some alternative structure can be established.
 
East Germany, 1989
After World War II, East Germany became a separate country,
ruled by the Communist Party and under the domination of the
Soviet Union. The East German government developed a powerful
apparatus for controlling the population. Favours were given to
those who supported the regime, while secret police spied on
possible opponents. There were opponents, but any public protest
was put down brutally, such as the demonstrations and strikes in
1953.
Real opportunities for change only came in the late 1980s. The
Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev, introduced a number of
reforms. One change was that Eastern European regimes could no
longer rely on Soviet troops to intervene in their support. As well,
reform processes were under way elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, the East German government appeared to be a
powerful opponent: it retained troops, weapons and a pervasive
system of surveillance.
Two processes were crucial in causing the collapse of the East
German regime: emigration and public protests. In 1961, the East
German government built a wall along the borders with West
Germany in order to prevent emigration to the west. In May 1989,
the 'iron curtain' between east and west was breached when the
Hungarian government pulled down the physical barrier between
Hungary and Austria. This allowed Hungarians to emigrate. East
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Germans could leave too, simply by taking a trip to Hungary. On
11 September, Hungary officially opened its border with Austria.
Some 15,000 East Germans emigrated within three days. The
massive exodus hurt the East German government seriously,
reducing its legitimacy.
Public protests also developed very quickly. Rallies in the streets
of East German cities began with a small number of people.
Within weeks, tens of thousands and then hundreds of thousands
were participating. The combination of massive rallies and
continued emigration of 10,000 people per day led the entire East
German government to resign in November 1989. The Berlin Wall
was dismantled. In 1990, free elections were held for the first
time.
The combination of exit (emigration) and voice (public protest)
was enough to undermine the repressive East German state. Many
of those who emigrated were key workers. East German industry,
transport and services were soon in deep trouble. More
importantly, massive emigration exposed the government's claim
that East Germany was on the road to being an ideal communist
state. The rallies were also essential in exposing the lack of
support for the government. With such a show of popular
opposition, government leaders did not dare to use force against
the population, for fear that troops would not obey and that
violence would only increase the opposition. Because the protests
were entirely nonviolent, there was no convenient pretext for
attacking the protesters. Furthermore, the nonviolence of the
protests made it much easier for more and more people to join in.
A number of existing conditions made the collapse of the East
German regime possible. First, it had only limited support from
the population. Second, its outside support (Soviet military
backing) was withdrawn. Third, people were able to exit to an
attractive alternative (West Germany). Fourth, there were
individuals and groups willing to challenge the government
openly.
The East German revolution of 1989 provides lessons for
challenging oppressive bureaucracies. After all, East Germany was
like a giant bureaucracy, run by the communist party elite and
controlling all people's lives. To challenge a powerful, oppressive
bureaucracy by using the combined effects of exit and voice
requires that:
the bureaucratic elites have only limited support;
the bureaucracy is not backed by another, more powerful
group (such as corporate elites who are backed by
governments);
there is an attractive alternative source of employment or
economic security;
there are members of the bureaucracy who are willing to
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organise open protests.
 
Social defence
If an entire system of nonviolent action could be planned and
prepared in advance, a society could defend itself nonviolently
against aggression or repression. This is called social defence,
which can be defined as nonviolent community resistance to
aggression as an alternative to military defence. It is also called
nonviolent defence, civilian-based defence and civilian defence.
As well as nonviolent action against aggressors, such as strikes,
fraternisation and setting up alternative institutions, there are also
offensive measures to be taken, such as communications to
undermine international and domestic support for the aggression.
Social defence does not mean just sitting there and accepting
whatever the aggressor inflicts.
Since social defence is based on popular participation, it removes
the dependence on a professional defence force. The nonviolent
methods used against a foreign aggressor can also be used against
local military forces that try to take power.
No society has ever systematically organised itself for social
defence. The historical examples of nonviolent action against
repressive governments provide many clues for building a
successful social defence system. Here we look only at the
relationship between social defence and bureaucracy. Imagine a
society that has developed a system of social defence. What should
bureaucrats do when confronted by a ruthless ruler? Should they
resign? Should they stay in their positions and try to protect their
subordinates and clients as much as possible? The answers to such
questions are difficult, especially because they have almost never
been asked or discussed. Some insights are available from the
experience in the Netherlands during the Nazi occupation.
 
Netherlands bureaucracies under the Nazis
by Mary Cawte
An occupier relies on bureaucracies for the successful
administration of the territory, and obviously so does the occupied
population. A bureaucrat who disobeys overtly may be dismissed
and replaced by a collaborator, with unfortunate consequences for
the population. Cooperation may further the war aims of the
enemy and cause suffering to the population. While opportunities
exist for Schweikism and resistance, bureaucrats taking this
course work on a slippery slope of collaboration in order to
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preserve these opportunities.
Postwar trials of those accused of collaboration are loaded with
difficult questions and moral dilemmas. In truth, civil servants
were working in a moral minefield, a situation made even more
problematic by their training and traditions, and by the putative
effect of the Hague International Convention setting out the rights
and responsibilities of both sides in the event of a military
occupation.
In 1937 the Dutch government prepared a set of rather vague
secret instructions for their civil servants in the event of a military
occupation, assuming that the occupier would respect the Hague
International Convention. On 10 May 1940 German troops
invaded the Netherlands. On 13 May the Queen and the Cabinet
escaped to England and later proclaimed their London
government-in-exile the legal administration. The Secretaries
General (the permanent heads of government departments) were
left to make their individual decisions whether or not to remain in
office and serve the Germans. The Directives of 1937 had advised
them to continue working if that served the Dutch population, but
to resign if such service was outweighed by the benefit to the
enemy.
On 13 May Hitler issued a decree establishing a German civil
government, and appointed a High Commissioner to supervise
existing Dutch administration. When the Secretaries General
decided in June to stay on, most of their subordinates did so also.
The High Commissioner was well satisfied, aware that the
introduction of rationing and security regulations and the transfer
of resources to Germany would be much easier if issued over the
signatures of the Secretaries General. At the same time he
assumed the right to issue laws by decree, and many such decrees
were issued. At first, while German power remained largely
unchallenged, these decrees were effective. Increasingly, however,
they were sabotaged directly or indirectly by patriotic officials, the
Resistance and the general population.
The German administration soon began discharging 'unreliable'
officials. (In November approximately 2500 Jewish officials were
dismissed.) As too few 'reliable' Nazis had the necessary technical
and administrative qualifications, complete nazification of the
bureaucracy was not feasible. By September 1943, however, the
High Commissioner had replaced eight out of eleven provincial
commissioners and the mayors of all major cities. Their powers
were greatly expanded, moreover, taking over the legislative
functions of the former elected municipal and provincial councils.
Sooner or later, most of the Secretaries General, facing demands
to which they could not agree, resigned or were removed. Of the
eleven serving in 1940, only three remained at the end of 1943.
Those who did serve to the end of the occupation in 1945 faced
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postwar commissions of inquiry which judged that too often civil
servants had been overly cautious and had assisted the enemy
rather than the general population.
In his defence, the Head of the Department of Internal Affairs,
described as 'a conservative civil servant with a limited horizon',
argued that he had been told in May 1940 to remain in office and
received no orders to the contrary, and that he collaborated to a
degree in order not to be replaced by a National Socialist. He
resented criticisms by the government-in-exile and attacks by the
Resistance. He claimed that in return for cooperation he obtained
a number of concessions, supported patriotic mayors, delayed or
weakened certain German measures (such as a proposed loyalty
declaration by all government officials), and often forced Germans
to do their own dirty work. Although he collaborated with
Germany's labour draft, he tried to decrease the numbers actually
drafted. Certainly after 1943 his attitude changed in response to
harsher German policies (as indeed did the attitude of most of the
population), and he refused to sign the order instituting a new
rationing system because he realised it was designed to catch
people in hiding. In 1944, after an attempt to assassinate him, he
himself went into hiding.
The Secretary General of the Departments of Agriculture and
Fisheries and of Commerce Industry and Shipping also remained
in office. 'An intelligent and capable official', he attempted to
prevent the complete collapse of the Dutch economy. Although he
realised that the German administration would use Dutch
resources to the fullest possible extent, he managed to convince
himself that 'political problems should not play any part in the
economic administration of the country'. During the occupation
he was attacked by both the underground press and the
government-in-exile. After the liberation he was suspended from
office because of his collaboration and eventually given an
honourable dismissal. Later he was regarded rather more
favourably, as it was judged that he 'played his cards close to his
chest and stubbornly and consistently followed a line of conduct
which he believed best served the interests of the population and
the prospects of postwar survival of the Netherlands as an
economically and socially viable state'.
The Acting Secretary General of the Department of Social Affairs
(appointed after his predecessor resigned in 1940) was prompted
by human and patriotic motives, and wanted to preserve public
health, to maintain social welfare and prevent hunger, disease and
death as far as possible. Having decided that he could do some
good by remaining in office, he then had to compromise more and
more, becoming 'one of the most submissive and collaborating
non-Nazi Secretaries General'. He was designated 'Number One
Bootlicker' by the underground press.
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The mayors of small towns, who were in charge of local police
forces (distinct from the German police apparatus), population
records and rationing offices, were in a particularly difficult
position. They had to cooperate enough to retain office but not
enough to lose people's confidence. At first, compromise enabled
them to cover for administrative sabotage by others, but later
when it involved cooperation in the pursuit of people in hiding,
compromise became impossible. Many mayors, and in some cases
entire police units, went underground.
In 1943, the resistance published an underground 'Commentary
on the 1937 Directives', to make them more specific, and more
importantly to stiffen bureaucratic resistance. The Commentary
urged strict non-compliance, even in the face of dismissal, and
emphasised that the government-in-exile remained the legal
government. Bureaucrats were individually responsible and would
be legally accountable after liberation. Endorsing the
Commentary, the Prime Minister stated further that bureaucrats
had no right to their own interpretations. And while the National-
Socialist Secretary General of Justice assured them that they could
plead duress in the event of an Allied victory, the underground
press warned that they could plead duress only if personally
threatened by 'disproportionately severe punishment'.
The Directives, however, had not been intended to organise
administrative resistance, but to adapt the administration to
occupation under the terms of the Hague International
Convention. The content was vague and not very useful in a
situation without precedent. And when in 1942 the Dutch
Supreme Court had an historic opportunity to give an opinion on
whether a particular German decree conformed to the Hague
Convention, it could not reach agreement and did not issue a
judgement.
One underground pamphlet of 1943, attacking bureaucrats who
remained in office because they thought 'they could do more good'
that way, argued that any compromise or expediency was wrong;
decisions could be based only on the inherent right or wrong of a
given situation. Unfortunately, government officials did not seem
to have a common set of values, apart from a traditional sense of
duty and a respect for bureaucratic process and efficiency.
The conduct of the bureaucrats has been scrutinised, assessed and
reassessed from various viewpoints during and after the
occupation. The questions remain. What should they have done?
What could they have done? What would you have done?
 
5. Alternatives to bureaucracy
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There are quite a few possible alternatives to bureaucracy as a way
of organising work. The important thing from our point of view is
alternatives that avoid the central problems of bureaucracy:
unaccountable power and domination.
Local autonomy
Running things on a smaller scale is one way to limit the power of
bureaucratic elites. Instead of an organisation to deal with a
population of millions, there might be many organisations each
dealing with populations of thousands. In smaller organisations,
personal relationships and face-to-face dealings reduce the effect
of hierarchy and the division of labour.
For example, consider a school system being administered by a
central bureaucracy, as in the state of New South Wales. The
syllabus for hundreds of schools is decided at the top. This gives
key directors and officials a vast amount of power to influence
what children are taught. If decisions about the school curriculum
are decentralised, with each school making decisions about
syllabus and staffing, then central domination is reduced.
With decentralisation there is, of course, the problem of local
abuses of power. But at least there may be the opportunity for
wider public participation in decision-making. Yet another stage
of decentralisation would be to provide generous support for
alternative schools, home schooling and learning by doing. Ending
compulsory schooling entirely would reduce the power of
educational bureaucracies. Whether or not one agrees with such
alternatives, this example illustrates how local autonomy can
undermine the power of bureaucratic elites.
Workers' control
An autonomous work group is a group of say 4 to 12 workers --
typically at a shop floor level -- who collectively decide on how
their job will be done and how the tasks will be divided up or
rotated. Sometimes such groups develop spontaneously, as in the
case of coal mining in Britain prior to mechanisation and at the
shopfloor level in many heavy industries. There have also been
diverse planned experiments with autonomous work groups. In
most cases the technical as well as the social aspects of the work
are reorganised, and so this alternative is sometimes referred to as
socio-technical design.
The experience with autonomous work groups has been highly
successful. No one is forced to join a work group, but for those
who do, job satisfaction, creativity and initiative almost invariably
increase. In addition, productivity is maintained and usually
increased. Because of greater job satisfaction, turnover,
absenteeism and sabotage are reduced.
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To take only one of many possible examples, in an experiment at a
pulp mill in Norway, work was reorganised so that skills were
upgraded and job rotation was introduced in a limited form. The
results included improvement in quality and costs of production,
better communication and teamwork between operators, and
many suggestions from the workers for technical improvements.
The key point here is that autonomous work groups reduce the
power of bureaucratic elites. Improvements in productivity and
satisfaction are a bonus. But these improvements also
demonstrate an important point. Bureaucratic systems are not
more efficient. The main reason they continue is that those at the
top would rather keep their power than experiment with
participatory alternatives.
When workers themselves decide what tasks they will do and how
they will carry them out, this is called workers' control or workers'
self-management. Instead of operating using hierarchy, self-
management involves a rough equality of power. This doesn't
mean that everyone does the same thing, but that workers decide
themselves what division of labour is appropriate. (What is called
'industrial democracy', by contrast, is usually much more limited,
typically involving worker representation on management
structures. This doesn't necessarily reduce the power of
bureaucratic elites.)
A slight generalisation from workers' control is worker-
community control. As well as workers, relevant members of the
community are involved in deciding what work should be done.
For example, in setting up transport systems, all members of the
community are potentially affected and could be involved in
decision-making. Thus development of alternatives to
bureaucracies quickly leads to the wider issue of participatory
democracy.
Participatory democracy
An autonomous work group can make decisions through face-to-
face discussions. But what about the larger scale, when there are
hundreds or thousands of workers? Some sort of system for
collective decision-making is needed. There are several models. A
familiar one is voting, whether directly on policy issues as in a
referendum or for representatives or delegates.
Another model is consensus, using formal procedures for seeking
agreements, proposing alternatives, making objections and
reaching agreement. Consensus methods can work well for
smallish groups but have difficulty when groups are large or there
are fundamental differences in values.
A little-tried method is random selection, as in selection of juries
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for trials. Instead of selecting decision-makers by appointment or
voting, they would be selected by lot from volunteers, with
procedures to ensure balance between men and women, etc. The
advantage of random selection is that those chosen have no
special mandate -- such as skills, experience or popularity -- and
thus are far less likely to gain unaccountable power. Experiments
in the United States and Germany have shown that randomly
selected groups of citizens can do an excellent job dealing with
complex and contentious issues, showing both commitment to the
task and a great deal of common sense. Random selection has
been used occasionally in industry for setting up decision-making
groups.
Combining random selection and local groups to deal with
particular functions gives a possible alternative to representative
democracy. This alternative has been called 'demarchy'.
Different goals
The best alternative to some bureaucracies would be to get rid of
them altogether. Spy agencies are used more to contain the
population than to resist outside enemies, and could be abolished
with no great loss to the rest of the population. Military forces
could be replaced by nonviolent community resistance, as
described in Section 4.
Bureaucracies are so dominant and so familiar that most people
do not think about the possibility of alternatives. There are many
possible alternatives, but they all need further investigation and
experimentation. Many of the alternatives need to be modified,
adapted or fine-tuned in order to be really effective -- just as
bureaucracies have had to be over many decades. The main point
is that there are alternatives.
 
6. Lessons
Based on our investigations, we have the following comments
concerning the task of challenging bureaucratic elites.
It is extremely difficult to change bureaucracies.
Most bureaucratic elites, however corrupt they may be, are never
challenged. Bureaucratic elites have enormous power to squash
opponents, for example the way the Vatican crushed the
Modernists. If we had wanted to, we could have listed case after
case of failed challenges. Our case studies are not a representative
cross-section of challenges, since we have included a good
number of successes.
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The challenges that are made usually aim to change policies or
personnel, not the structure of bureaucracy itself. The campaign
against the Australia Card didn't aim to change the Australian
government bureaucracies. It had success in stopping the
proposed identity card, but the government's basic goal was
achieved through other means.
Sometimes, though, a campaign to change a policy can lead to
changes in the bureaucracy. The women's campaign against BHP
hiring practices led to a degree of change in the company, namely
a less anti-women working environment. This was a significant
change, even if the basic hierarchical relationships remained.
To change bureaucracies, a collective challenge is
needed.
A lone whistleblower like Vince Neary has little chance of success.
Speaking the truth is seldom a good strategy just on its own. It's
also necessary to mobilise other supporters on the inside or
outside.
The idea that bureaucracies are similar to authoritarian states is a
useful one. To challenge an authoritarian state requires a careful
strategy. Building support is crucial. Courageous individuals are
needed to make open challenges, but these have to be planned in
ways that build further support. Some of the methods that can be
used in mounting a challenge are: careful documentation of
problems; holding discussions and meetings; circulating leaflets
and publishing letters and articles; liaising with the media;
building links with outside groups; and using a variety of methods
of nonviolent action, from rallies to pickets and occupations.
The Dutch soldiers' movement carried out its campaigns
effectively. By organising a union and operating collectively, the
movement accomplished much more than any number of isolated
protesters could have. A military bureaucracy is very similar
indeed to an authoritarian state, but even states can be toppled
through nonviolent action.
To have any chance of achieving lasting change, it is
vitally important to have an alternative.
Most challenges to bureaucratic elites do not even imagine the
possibility that there are alternatives to bureaucratic systems,
hence they are unlikely to lead to lasting change.
Struggles to change bureaucracy are usually lengthy.
The Movement for the Ordination of Women took ten years to
change the official policy of the Anglican Church in Australia, and
even that is not enough to transform the male-dominated power
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structure. Attempts to reform prison structures may require
decades and there is the constant danger of a reversion to
traditional hierarchical systems.
Is it a good idea for activists to make plans for years or decades?
Certainly it helps for some to have a long-term vision. But how
many people would join a campaign that was expected to last
years? Most people get involved with the idea of a quick victory,
and some of them then become committed through their
experiences. How to build a long-term campaign is a difficult
challenge. Bureaucracies by their nature have the long-term
commitment of workers, especially the elites. It is far easier to go
along with the prevailing way of doing things rather than
constantly pushing for change.
A key to change is legitimacy.
If citizens withdraw support, even the most oppressive regime will
collapse. Bureaucracies are similarly vulnerable. But just saying
'withdraw support' is inadequate. The question is how.
Challengers need to understand, through analysis or experience,
how the bureaucracy maintains loyalty, how communication
systems operate, how links are made with other organisations,
how power is exercised against dissent, how people's beliefs and
commitments are forged. Not easy! Furthermore, just
understanding how the system operates is not enough. It's
necessary to know what actions will bring about change.
There's a great need for study of the process of
bureaucratic change from the grassroots, of
experimentation with alternative ways of organising
work, and of testing out various ways of probing and
challenging bureaucracies.
Even just raising the idea that bureaucracy is not the only way of
organising work is significant. The idea of democratic alternatives
to bureaucracies, not just policy or personnel change within
bureaucratic structures, needs to be put on the agenda of activists
pushing for a more participatory society.
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